In this paper we propose a continuous-variable subcarrier wave quantum key distribution scheme with homodyne detection and present its security analysis in the finite-size regime. We calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate for the system under the assumption that the quantum channel noise is negligible compared to detector dark counts, and an eavesdropper is restricted to collective attacks. Our calculation shows that the current realistic system implementation would allow distributing a secret keys over channels with losses up to 9 dB.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of sharing symmetric cryptographic keys between two parties that is based on encoding information in the states of quantum objects and subsequent distillation of the key through a classic communication channel. The first quantum cryptography protocols exploited the quantum system with discrete degrees of freedoms [1] [2] [3] . A numerous amount of different techniques for security proofs for discrete variable QKD systems has already been presented [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . Experimental implementations of this family of QKD protocols rely on single-photon detectors for quantum state measurements.
In turn, continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD), which was proposed later, relies on methods of coherent detection, homodyne or heterodyne, for gaining information about the quantum states. In other words, single-photon detection is replaced by conventional optical communication methods. However, security proofs for CV-QKD protocols currently remain less advanced 14, 15 .
There are two types of CV protocols that differ by signal modulation method: Gaussian 16, 17 , where the complex amplitudes of coherent states are selected randomly from a normal distribution, and discrete modulation [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] with weak coherent phase-coded states. Other CV-QKD protocols are based on two-mode squeezed vacuum states transmission and measurement via homodyne or heterodyne detection 23 . Security proofs for Gaussian CV-QKD protocols remain the most developed: they were presented against general attacks in the finite key regime using several different approaches 24 . Security analysis for CV-QKD protocol with two-mode squeezed vacuum states was also performed 25, 26 . Discrete-variable CV-QKD protocols possess several important advantages; among those are relative implementation simplicity and a possibility to minimize the number of parameters that need to be monitored. Nevertheless, security proofs for discrete-modulation CV-QKD systems require special consideration. In the asymptotic limit, its security has been proven against collective attacks 27 . Recently it was shown that security proof for CV-QKD with discrete modulation against general attacks is possible 27 . To the best of our knowledge, existing security proofs do not take into consideration arbitrary attacks and finite-key effects for a realistic system implementation.
Here we propose a new implementation of CV QKD protocol with discrete modulation based on subcarrier wave quantum key distribution (SCW QKD) system [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . From telecommunication point of view, SCW QKD approach possesses several significant advantages. Firstly, it is intrinsically robust against external conditions affecting the fiber and is ready to function in conventional telecom infrastructure. Secondly, it demonstrates unmatched spectral efficiency in the quantum channel, allowing for distributing several keys on separate closely-packed sidebands around a single optical carrier 29 . Thirdly, recent experiments 37 have shown that preservation of SCW quantum signal parameters in respect to the carrier allows transmitting phase-encoded quantum signals through the air providing invariance to telescope rotation that remains an important obstacle in traditional polarization-based free-space quantum communication, making the same QKD kit suitable for fiber and free-space QKD networks. Security proof of SCW QKD against collective beam-splitting attack was proposed in 36 , and more recently general finite-key security proof for discrete-variable protocol SCW QKD was presented in 38 .
In this paper we consider a new protocol for SCW CV-QKD with discrete modulation, propose a principle scheme of its implementation and perform finite-key security analysis using a fully quantum asymptotic equipartition property technique 8 . We calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate under the assumption that detector dark counts remain a dominant contribution to the total noise 20 . The key rates are obtained for direct reconciliation scheme with post-selection in case of collective attacks.
Results

Continuous-variable SCW QKD setup
In SCW QKD the signal photons are not emitted directly by a laser source but are generated on subcarrier frequencies, or sidebands, in course of phase modulation of an intense optical carrier. Laser source emits coherent light with frequency ω. Alice modulates this beam in a traveling wave electro-optical phase modulator with the microwave field with frequency Ω and phase ϕ A 39 . As a result, pairs of sidebands are formed at frequencies ω k = ω + kΩ, where integer k runs between the limits: −S ≤ k ≤ S. Modulation index is chosen so that the total number of photons in the sidebands is less than unity, thus providing non-orthogonality of the chosen set of states, as required by the no-cloning theorem 40 . If Bob applies similar modulation introducing ϕ B , filters out the carrier wave, and registers the subcarrier interference results on a single-photon detector, they parties can implement a discrete variable QKD protocol as discussed in 30, 36, 38 .
Principal scheme of the SCW QKD with coherent detection. PSM is an electro-optical phase modulator; SF is a spectral filter that cuts off the carrier; PD is a photodiode; BD is a balanced subtraction detector. Diagrams in circles show the module of signal spectrum taking into account only the first-order subcarrier waves.
The proposed setup, based on original discrete-variable SCW QKD scheme 30 , but with altered detector part on Bob's side, is shown in Fig. 1 . In this scheme state preparation process in Alice remains the same. However, in the receiver module Bob applies much higher modulation index for introducting ϕ B in each transmission window T , so that the photon number at the sidebands becomes almost identical to the carrier wave. The resulting subcarrier wave power depends on the values of ϕ A and ϕ B . When Alice and Bob introduce equal phase shifts constructive interference is observed at the sidebands signal. A spectral filter is used for separating the carrier and the sidebands signals. Finally, Bob uses a balanced detector instead of a single-photon one, directing both sidebands to one photodiode, and the carrier wave to another. We therefore implement a homodyne detection scheme in SCW QKD, in which the carrier wave plays the role of a local oscillator.
Quantum state preparation
Our system is able to implement protocols with any even number of coherent phase-coded states. The state can be described in terms of representation basis of abelian cyclic point symmetry groups C M respectively. The protocol which we propose here is based on four coherent phase-coded states (number of bases N = 2). The initial state at Alice's side is
where |vac SB is the sidebands vacuum state and √ µ 0 0 is the carrier wave coherent state with the average number of photons µ 0 emitted from a coherent monochromatic light source with frequency ω.
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The state at the Alice's modulator output is a multimode coherent state
with coherent amplitudes
where θ 1 is a constant phase and d S nk (β A ) is the Wigner d-function that appears in the quantum theory of angular momentum 41 . Argument of the d-function β A is determined by the Alice's modulation index m A , disregarding the modulator medium dispersion this dependence can be written as
(
The detailed description of electro-optic modulation process for quantum states can be found in 42 .
Detection
The traveling wave phase modulator on the Bob's side has the same modulation frequency Ω as in the Alice's one, but a different phase ϕ B and modulation index m B . The resulting state is also a multimode coherent state
where η(L) is the transmission coefficient of the quantum channel. New argument of the d-function is
where θ 2 and ϕ 0 are phases determined by phase modulator structure 42 . In order to achieve constructive interference, Bob should use ϕ 0 as an offset for his phase and apply microwave phase ϕ = ϕ 0 + ϕ B in his modulator. According to 36 the average number of photons arriving at the first arm of Bob's detector in the transmission window T is
η B is the losses in Bob's module and ϑ is carrier wave attenuation factor. Thus the average number of photons arriving at the second arm of Bob's detector is
After simple mathematical manipulations, we obtain
where δ = β B /β A . Then, depending on the phase ϕ B chosen by Bob (taking into account the correct basis), the number of photons arriving at Bob's detectors will be greater either at the first or the second arm of the balanced detector. The argument of d-function β A (and, subsequently, the modulation index) is determined by the average photon number depending on theoretical security analysis. The parameter δ as a ratio of modulation indices is optimized in order to achieve the same distinguishability of quadratures at different phases in a correctly chosen basis, so that (n 1 (0, 0) − n 2 (0, 0)) = |n 1 (π, π) − n 2 (π, π) |. Hence Bob observes the quadrature distributions that are symmetrically offset with respect to zero.
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Quantum bit error rate Succeeding the detection stage for pulses in correct bases we obtain two probability density distributions (Fig. 2 ) that contain information about binary signals. Our channel is characterised by excess noise variance Ξ and vacuum noise variance, which is constantly defined as V = 1/4 20, 43 . So, the probability density to obtain v conditioned by the amplitude α k is:
The overlap between the distributions contributes to the bit errors. Bob can set the threshold value v 0 in order to reduce the number of errors, then Bob expects "0", if v < −v 0 and "1", if v > v 0 , thereby increasing inconclusive result. Therefore for each choice of basis it has two input values, Alice's bits x = {0, 1}, and three output values: Bob's bits y = {0, 1} and an inconclusive result or y =?. Considering the quantum channel as a binary symmetric channel (BSC), one may estimate detection probability density (1 − g), where (g) is erasure, and the probability density that Bob assigns the wrong bit value (e), in other words, if ϕ A = ϕ B = π we obtain:
After the post-selection stage, bit error rate is Q = E/P, where E is error probability and P is post-selection rate. 
Holevo bound
Let us consider a collective attack in the asymptotic limit on infinitely long keys for the case of our system and compute the corresponding asymptotic collective key rate using the Devetak-Winter approach 44 . We estimate an upper bound for Eve's knowledge about the data using Holevo bound 45 for weak coherent states. Finite-key analysis for our protocol is presented in the following section.
Here we use direct reconciliation scheme. In this case Alice sends error correction information to Bob and the secret key is determined by Alice's data. Eve can rotate all states stored in her quantum memory after reconciliation and before her measurement. Holevo bound can be found considering unconditioned channel density operator. The Eve's quantum state, conditioned on Alice's data, is
Eve needs to discriminate between the states in one basis 
where S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy, index k enumerates the possible states in the quantum channel, ρ k is the ancilla state under condition that kth state was attacked, p k is the weight of the kth state. The von Neumann entropy of a density operator is the Shannon entropy of its eigenvalues. The eigenvalues of the channel density operator ρ are
The overlapping of our states can be described as
We therefore obtain the Holevo bound using binary Shannon entropy function h(x):
Now we are able to estimate the secure key generation rate K:
The secret key rates as functions of channel loss are shown in Fig. 3 . For these calculations we use experimental parameters of the experimental SCW QKD systems 30 : T = 100 ns, η B = 10 −0.64 , θ = 10 −6 , ϕ 0 = 5 • . We consider the ideal case and the case of the excess noise variance Ξ = 0.1. The parameters µ, µ 0 and v 0 are optimized so as to maximize the secret key rate. The value v 0 was optimized for losses at various distances. As can be seen, the key rates decrease slower than in the case of assumption that the quantum channel is Gaussian 46 . Equation (19) describes only the asymptotic case of infinitely long key sequences. In order to evaluate real keys it makes sense to carry out another estimation taking into account finite-key effects.
Secure key generation rate with finite-key effects
To estimate appropriate bound on secure key rate we consider the notation of Rényi entropies since they describe the worst case and not the average one 9, 47 . We bound ε-smooth min-entropy 38, 47, 48 as follows: 
here and H(A|E) is conditional von Neumann entropy and it denotes the entropy of Alice's bit conditioned on Eve's sideinformation in a single round, Eve's side information is E. Conditional von Neumann entropy in case of direct reconciliation can be bounded as H(A|E) ≥ 1 − χ DR . On the error correction step both parties should check and remover the errors in their bit strings. Here we assume that Alice and Bob use low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes 49 . Bob randomly chooses a k bits and sends them to Alice, then Alice estimates the quantum channel parameters. It should be noted that LDPC codes succeed only if the actual error rate value Q real is less than a reference value parameterized in the code. Thus, Alice needs to consider an additional error rate fraction ∆Q. It can be estimated in order to maximize the probability of successful error correction in one round while keeping the secret key rate as high as possible. Then Alice computes the syndrome of LDPC code that corrects up to n(Q est + ∆Q) error bits. We denote the length of the syndrome as
where f EC is error correction efficiency. Using the syndrome, Bob corrects the bits forming some new bit string B' and applies a two-universal hash function with output length check EC . Bob then sends the hash to Alice in order to check whether their strings match. If the hashes are different, Alice enlarges ∆Q or aborts the protocol. Otherwise Alice obtains the bit string A'. The remaining smooth-entropy is
where sample size k is estimated by maximizing the key rate 38 . At privacy amplification step Alice and Bob hash their bit strings to a key of length l 38, 50
At the error correction step, we have to estimate "correctness error" ε EC . From the properties of 2-universal hashing ε EC is
The trace distance d between the protocol output and an ideal output is bounded by d ≤ ε s + ε PA . We therefore obtain that the protocol is ε QKD -secure and correct protocol, with ε QKD = ε EC + ε s + ε PA . Finally, the dependence of average secret key rates 6/9 on losses in the quantum channel for different values of n is
It should be noted that in the asymptotic case n → ∞, the equations (19) and (26) converge to the same expression. The secret key rates for different values of n are presented in Fig. 4 as a function of channel loss. The parameters µ, µ 0 , k and v 0 are optimized so as to maximize the secret key rate. The value v 0 is also optimized for losses at various distances. The considered security parameters are as follows: ε s = ε PA = 10 −10 , ε EC = 2 −256 .
Discussion
In this paper we introduced a new scheme for continuous variable subcarrier wave quantum key distribution. We calculated the secure key rate for discrete modulation CV-QKD protocol with post selection in the asymptotic and finite-size regime. We calculated the lower bound on the secret key rate for the CV-QKD system under the assumption that the quantum channel noise is negligible compared to detector noise and Eve is restricted to collective attacks. Our calculation shows that the system allows to provide a secret key for channel losses up to 9 dB in a realistic system implementation. It is important to note that our scheme also allows to implement CV-QKD with Gaussian modulation and the presented security analysis can be adopted there. Subsequent works will focus on a full security proof, as well as the experimental implementation of the proposed protocol.
